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We did some hard training in the jungle but we really felt we were 
wasting our time before going to the Middle East. When news of the 
Japs came we thought we were going to despatch them quick smart. 
We really knew very little about them. 
W.H. (Bill) Bathgate (Cpt. 8 Div. AIF)^ 
It has been claimed that 'fear of Japan was a major factor in 
Australian thinking about defence and foreign affairs' following 
Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905 and that this produced the 'Japanese 
phase' in foreign relations from 1905 to 1941.^ Bill Bathgate and his 
fellow Australians were, however, neither aware of this national angst 
nor adequately prepared to meet such an enemy in the battle for 
Singapore in 1942. A mood of laconic resentment, directed at 
authorities responsible for planning, equipment and intelligence, runs 
through the reminiscences of those who survived the campaign and 
years as prisoners of war. The belief that the Japanese was a myopic 
and inferior enemy is consistent, as is the view that garrison duty and 
later, the defeat of the Japanese, would merely be an irrigating 
diversion en route to the main theatres of war. 
Men Uke Bathgate now believe if blame is to be apportioned it 
should be shared by all Australians — the nation collectively should 
carry responsibility for past ignorance and apathy. It is a sentiment 
echoed in several popular books about the Pacific war. Gilbert Mant, 
solider and journalist, despaired of the 'complacency and smugness' 
of an Australia which sent 2000 untrained recruits into Singapore in 
early 1942. Most had never handled a rifle. Geoffrey Scott, author 
of the Knights of Kokoda, claimed authorities were so desperate in 
1942 that many 53rd Battalion militiamen where 'shangaied' before 
saihng from Sydney for New Guinea 'without even ... saying goodbye 
to their famihes'. Russell Braddon's The Naked Island is a scathing 
monument to his beUef that in 1941 Australians were ill-informed and 
ill-prepared for war with Japan. What Australians appear to have 
remembered best of Braddon are his descriptions of Japanese brutality 
and a phrase which originally appeared on the last page of his book 
— the warning that the war with Japan would last one hundred 
years.^ 
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It appears Australia's relatively short wartime encounter with Japan 
has a retrospective tradition which is more illusory than real. If traced 
to Japan's defeat of China in 1895, that tradition is now approaching 
its centenary and is only slowly being eroded. In 1989 one third of 
all Australians still disliked or mistrusted Japan,'' something former 
POW Bathgate believes has been counter-productive. As with 
Braddon, his years in Changi and Japan left a legacy of bitterness. 
Bathgate, however, had the advantage of seeing first hand a war-
ravaged Japan which he judged defeated at least two years before its 
surrender. He thus returned to Australia with a different set of 
memories — and skills — which he turned to advantage. In 1988 he 
retired as chairman of the Australian board of Fujistu. 
Perhaps the greatest irony is that it was an Australian, not a 
Japanese, who first suggested Japan should stage an armed threat 
against Australia. This peculiar suggestion was made in 1894 by 
Melbourne businessman and part-time diplomat, Alfred Marks. In 
1859, when Japan opened a port to foreigners, a youthful Marks 
became a trader in Kanagawa (Yokohama). After returning to 
Australia in 1872 he promoted bilateral trade and in 1879 was 
appointed honorary consuU for Japan, 55 years before AustraUa sent 
a trade representative to Japan. In April 1894 he wrote to the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry outlining Queensland concerns about unemployed 
Japanese becoming a burden on the colony. The Queensland 
parliament was debating a poll tax on Japanese pearl divers and Marks 
suggested that Japan should send a warship to the state for 'moral 
effect'. Japan, then at war with China, did not respond.^ 
If fear of Japan was manifest among Australians last century, it 
was most obvious in the redoubtable W.M. (Billy) Hughes who, in 
1901, joined other federal parliamentarians to pass the Immigration 
Restriction Act which gave Australia its infamous White Australia 
Policy. Hughes' animosity towards Japan appears to have its origins, 
not in Japan's 1895 victory over China, but in his concern for 
Australian workers and his desired to protect them from cheap Asian 
labour imports. Hughes was a pioneering labour organiser and still 
held senior union positions on becoming prime minister in 1916. 
Although his early objective was to safeguard Australians from any 
Asian threat, there is no doubt that his focus on Japan after 1905 
did considerable long-term damage. This resulted from his longevity 
in public life at a critical time in Australia's development. He was 
still a federal parliamentarian when he died in 1952 aged ninety. 
Extensive Japanese naval assistance with the defence of Australia 
and its shipping against Germany during World War I seems only 
to have deepened Hughes' suspicions. In Japan he became infamous 
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for blocking Japan's plea for international recognition of racial 
equality at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference. Hughes offended 
not only Japan, which had expected gratitude, but also embarrassed 
the Labor party, angered members of his cabinet and most of his staff 
at Versailles, including Frederic Eggleston, J.C. Latham and Major 
E.L. Piesse. Eggleston left Hughes before the conference ended while 
Piesse, in a personal note to Latham, later confided he was not 
optimistic about future relations with Japan.* He was soon to 
become embroiled in a personal feud with Hughes which may have 
cost Australia dearly. 
Piesse had been wartime director of military intelligence and an 
adherent of the 'Japanese threat' school of thought. In 1918 he began 
studying Japan, possibly guided by James Murdoch, foundation 
Professor of Oriental Studies at the University of Sydney and 
Duntroon Royal Military College, a wartime Hughes' government 
appointment. In late 1919 Piesse returned from Versailles via the Far 
East and Japan. As the first Australian official to visit the region, 
he was made welcome, despite Hughes' performance at Versailles. 
Thereafter his attitude to Japan changed. 
In 1920 Hughes ordered Piesse and E. Longfield Lloyd, head of 
New South Wales military intelligence, to investigate reports of 
Japanese activities around Newcastle. Piesse resented the order and 
went to Newcastle against his will. Lloyd became convinced the 
Japanese were engaged in espionage. Piesse was not, played down 
Lloyd's report and took issue with his prime minister over Hughes' 
public statements about Japan. The government took no action on 
the reports although Lloyd's men kept watch on Japanese activities 
until 1926.' Relations deteriorated further when Hughes refused 
Piesse permission to speak or contribute to public debate and omitted 
him from the 1921 imperial conference in London. There Hughes 
argued for treaties to protect the Pacific from Japanese naval power, 
leading to the Washington conference of 1921/22. Piesse, after 
attending that conference with another minister, was convinced the 
Washington treaties would curtail Japanese expansion and guarantee 
Austrahan security. He recommended abandoning close study of 
Japan and Hughes, now tired and under increasing domestic political 
pressure, demurred. 
The dispute between the two men had far-reaching effects and 
highlights the shortage of expert advisers in foreign affairs. Hughes 
had disbanded Australia's first external affairs department in 1916 
incorporating it in his prime minister's department. By 1922 it had 
only a one-man Foreign Section (Central) and a Foreign Section 
(Pacific) under Piesse. Piesse then argued against developing an 
Austrahan diplomatic service — against the wishes of Hughes. Piesse 
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believed independence in foreign affairs was a 'danger to the 
diplomatic unity' of empire and that 'obtaining suitable envoys and 
staffs' would be expensive and difficult. He had argued himself out 
of a job and resigned in November 1923 complaining that the new 
Bruce-Page government was 'not making much use' of him and that 
some personal relations were difficult.^ 
In 1924 government and opposition agreed it was 'the desire of every 
man and woman in Australia to decrease armaments' and turned to 
national development. Australia ignored the 1926 imperial conference 
offer of foreign affairs autonomy and continued to look to Britain. 
Piesse, now a commentator on public affairs, argued that fears about 
Japan should be set aside and that newspapers and government were 
failing to provide adequate information for Australians to make 
judgements.' It is ironic that he did not recognise that his personal 
legacy was government apathy towards foreign affairs, based on the 
false premise that if Japan was no longer a threat it was no longer 
worth close consideration. 
Japan was, however, attempting to forge better relations as Australia 
was fast becoming an important trading partner. In December 1925, 
Consul-General Tokugawa lemasa, son of Prince Tokugawa, arrived 
with a message of 'everlasting peace'. Prime Minister Bruce ignored 
White Australia, Versailles and Hughes, to claim a tradition of bilateral 
'comradeship' in the 'cause of justice and right'. Austrahans hoped 
to achieve the 'closest relations' with the Japanese people.'" 
This was not reflected in foreign affairs. Japan had more consults 
than Australia had advisers on foreign affairs. The prime minister's 
department usually had only two. Even after the Department of 
External Affairs was created in 1935, it had a staff of just ten, four 
of whom were typists and a fifth a messenger. At the same time 
Japanese consulates had nine accredited representatives and regularly 
pleaded for increased contact between the nations." This the 
government left to a few individuals and groups such as the Institute 
of Pacific Relations (1925) and Japan-Austraha Society (1928). Guided 
by men such as Eggleston, however, early institute meetings in 
Honolulu and Kyoto became forums at which Australia could reaffirm 
its determination to remain racially apart from Asia. Under Sydney 
property developer Sir Arthur Rickard, a public supporter of White 
Australia, the society's role was equally ambiguous. He and Lady 
Rickard had toured Japan in the early 1920s and returned with an 
art collection and most impressed by Japan's cultural heritage. 
Although he did much to encourage trade and cultural relations, Sir 
Arthur refused a Japanese imperial honour for 'secret anti-socialist 
services' in 1941, suggesting a political motivation lay behind his two 
decades of support for the Japanese.'^ 
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Files seized from Japan's Sydney consulate on the outbreak of the 
Pacific War confirm that its staff cultivated Australians to promote 
its cause. Close contacts included Lt.Col. Douglas H. Graves and 
N.M.G. Lina, who made donations to Japan's national defence; Dr 
Rupert Hornabrook who also had contact with senior government 
and army officials in Japan; and, Ernest R. Clifford who applied for 
Japanese citizenship. Some, such as scientist Dr Ian Clunies-Ross, 
were trying to redress government inactivity. Others, such as Rickard, 
and A.C.V. Melbourne, feared communism more than Japan. A 
postwar security file cites Melbourne as a 'sympathetic' correspondent 
who, until 1938, saw Japan as the 'bulwark of the East' against 
communism — an attitude with much currency in youthful Australia. 
As Consul-General Torao Wakamatsu noted in his 1939 farewell 
speech, Australians would have been surprised by the true extent of 
the 'sincerest respect for Japan and her foreign policy' although most 
were 'unfortunately' unable to 'give wider publicity to their opinions'. 
Some, however, were. 
Japanese files record cash payments to journalists from 1937 and 
lavish entertainment for media executives after the creation in 1938 
of a Sydney-based 'Enlightenment Committee' to encourage a friendly 
press. Its targets included prominent newspapermen F.N. Cutlack, 
H.K. Prior, Adrian Deamer, A.M. Pooley, 'G.N. Strong' and P.R. 
Stephenson. Journalists employed directly by the Japanese included 
H.V. Millington, Tom Walsh and John H.C. Sleeman. From 1938 
Sleeman received £ 4 a week for services at the consulate and special 
fees for 'information'. He was briefly interned during the Pacific War 
and died in July 1946. New South Wales Premier Jack Lang had 
employed Sleeman in 1930 as government publicity officer despite his 
1922 criminal conviction for attempted bribery of Queensland Labor 
politician F.T. Brennan.' 
A secret report sent to Attorney-General H.V. Evatt, in September 
1946, dismissed most Japanese contacts as insane, deranged, eccentric, 
senile or dead. It described only one person, who eluded capture, as 
a Japanese agent. The report also glossed over offers of Australian 
inventions, including armoured cars, gasmasks, armour piercing shells 
and a submarine safety device, made to the Japanese between 1930 
and 1941. These glib dismissals of pre-war actions suggest interested 
parties believed they had nothing to gain from a more rigorous 
investigation which might have drawn attention not only to ignorance, 
but also to incompetence on the part of authorities.^ 
When Australians went to the polls in December 1931, they faced 
an uncertain future in a nation ravaged by political instability and 
depression. J.H. Scullin lost to the conservative United Australia Party 
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led by former Labor treasurer, J.A. (Joe) Lyons. Japan's attack on 
Manchuria in September had gone almost unnoticed. In January 1932, 
J.C. Latham became deputy prime minister, attorney-general and 
minister for industry and, external affairs. His principal foreign affairs 
advisor. Major F.K. Officer, was an ardent supporter of the 'efficiency 
and economy' of British foreign affairs advice. 
After fighting broke out between Japanese and Chinese forces around 
Shanghai, indicating Japan's ambitions extended beyond Manchuria, 
Latham attempted to deflect attention by telling parliament that 'harm 
might be done' if the matter was discussed in detail. The government 
lent its assistance to a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese 
dispute.'^ The government, financially unable to provide Australia 
with adequate defence, and without the advice of an independent 
foreign service, was playing a dangerous game of bluff. This was 
exposed in a series of reports published in 1932 by individuals and 
groups concerned about trade, critical of the government's handling 
of relations with Asia. Australia's trade imbalance with Japan for the 
previous ten years had risen to £ 78 million in Australia's favour. In 
1931 Australia was Japan's fourth most important overseas 
suppUer.'^ 
The first report, by the Australian-Japan Society (AJS) in Tokyo, 
appeared in March 1932 when Japan was suffering severe economic 
depression, political instability and international censure. Its business 
leaders were desperate for legitimate export markets. The army, 
emboldened by its success in Manchuria, was gaining political strength 
and encouraging aggressive nationalism, the army, swollen by rural 
poverty and unemployment, was seeking economic gains and was 
intent on keeping the powerful zaibatsu out of Manchuria. The 
publication of the AJS report coincided with the murders of former 
Finance Minister Innoue Junnosuke and Mitsui chief executive Dan 
Takuma by extremists seeking revenge for rural hardship. Reflecting 
Japanese desperation, the AJS was extremely critical of Australia as 
a trading partner. It called for a commercial treaty, a lowering of 
Australian tariffs, freight rates and stamp duties; and improvements 
in foreign exchange dealings, communications and diplomatic links. 
Implicit was both a plea and a threat. It suggested that Australia 
engaged in restrictive trade practices which Japan threatened to redress 
by boycotting Australian products which h claimed were often shoddy 
and overpriced. The report recommended Australia appoint a trade 
commissioner in Japan." 
The second report was compiled by commonwealth consultant on 
national development, H.W. Gepp, who visited China in September 
1931 as deputy leader of the Australian delegation to the Institute 
of Pacific Relations. Using his daughter as secretary, Gepp began 
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compiling unofficial notes which became an official report in 
September 1932 recommending Australia send a trade delegation to 
the East and appoint a trade commissioner to Japan, assessing the 
expense as 'small compared to the value obtained'. Gepp believed it 
was time Australia confronted its racism. In a Melbourne Herald 
article, he suggested 'national superiority complexes' could be 
'reduced and subdued' by increased contact between nations.'* 
The third report, commissioned by the University of Queensland, 
was initiated and funded by business interests looking for new markets. 
History lecturer A.C.V. Melbourne was sent to China and Japan for 
four months. Of all the reports his was the most damning. He was 
scathing in his criticisms of government, producers, bankers and the 
Australian people who had not yet realised that 'a complete revision 
of all external relationships' was necessary. He claimed Austraha had 
yet to 'assume the responsibilities of nationhood' and was insisting 
on a status it did not know how to use, clinging to 'the apron strings 
of the mother country, politically, commercially and financially'. 
Melbourne recommended sweeping changes to trade and financial 
practices he regarded as stupid in the extreme; improvements to the 
quahty and packaging of exports to Japan; the appointment of a trade 
commissioner; and that Australia 'make the best use of the period 
of security, for it may well be very brief.'" 
The reports came too late. In July-August 1932 Australia signed 
the empire trade preference agreement at Ottawa and then passed the 
United Kingdom and Australia Trade Agreement Act. The Defence 
Department then seized on the escalating Sino-Japanese conflict to 
export arms to China. The suggestion was put to government by 
Sydney journalist, A.N. Pooley, editor of Birt's Shipping and Trade 
Review. Apart from Birt's Japanese associations, Pooley had a 
background in British naval intelhgence and Japanese studies dating 
from his early years at Cambridge University. In 1931 he had authored 
a series of press articles urging Australia to use Japan's Manchurian 
adventure to increase exports. The Defence Department saw an 
opportunity to sell World War I surplus and prevent the closure of 
the Lithgow small arms factory. In October 1932 it approved the sale 
of 50,000 rifles to China. Confusion dogged final settlement when 
Britain, which had been selling arms to both China and Japan, placed 
an arms embargo on the warring states after Japan walked out of 
the League of Nations in February 1933. 
The extent of Australia's foreign affairs disorganisation is evident 
in a March 1933 cable by Latham to former prime minister S.M. 
Bruce, in London trying to renegotiate AustraHa's depression debts. 
Latham was astonished that the press, and not the British government, 
should inform the Austrahan government of Britain's decision to take 
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'unilateral' action against China and Japan. Bruce explained the 
embargo was restricted to arms. In April the Japanese consul-general 
further muddied the waters by informing Canberra that he was at a 
loss to understand why he had been approached by a trader telling 
him that Britain had asked Australia to supply Japan with 
munitions.' Latham finally vetoed the sale. The obsolete weaponry 
was saved for Australians to fight the Japanese in Malaya, Singapore 
and New Guinea. 
Meanwhile, the 1932 trade reports had prompted a Sydney 
conference on eastern trade in February 1933. The commonwealth, 
states, primary and secondary industry, trade groups and consuls-
general of Japan, China and the Netherlands attended. Australian 
business groups opposed the appointment of eastern trade 
commissioners but a resolution, moved by Gepp and seconded by 
Melbourne, that Australia despatch a trade delegation to the East at 
an early date, was passed. Canberra finally decided against a trade 
delegation and opted for a ministerial mission and trade commissioner 
for Japan. In December 1933 Latham sent Lyons a brief hand-written 
note recommending a 'gentleman of good address', Longfield Lloyd, 
for the task. Lloyd 'spoke Japanese, knew who the Japanese were in 
Sydney and was very friendly with them.'^ Doubtless the Japanese 
were also well aware of Lloyd's position in military intelligence. After 
being transferred to the prime minister's department, Lloyd joined 
Latham's 1934 Eastern Mission, the first by an external affairs 
minister. 
Latham returned sympathetic to Japan's claim to Manchuria and 
urged that a face-saving solution for Japan and the League of Nations 
be found. That this would be unsatisfactory to China 'could not be 
helped'. In a secret report to Lyons, Latham also recounted how he 
had told Japanese Foreign Minister K. Hirota that any southward 
advance must involve Hong Kong and Singapore being 'put out of 
action'; that if Japan attempted to land an army in Austraha it would 
find a 'very lively nest of hornets'; and that any attack on a 'white' 
power would probably attract America's interest. Latham then told 
parliament he was glad Australia was a European community. He was 
maintaining his game of bluff and promoting the Sino-Japanese 
conflict as a local dispute between Asians. Despite criticism from 
Australia's defence chiefs, by 1933 the depression saw defence spending 
fall to less than half a per cent of Gross National Product, its lowest 
point of the inter-war period.' Canberra saw appeasement as the 
solution to the problems it was ignoring and exacerbating. 
Melbourne, then chairman of the Queensland and commonwealth 
advisory committees on eastern trade, believed the situation was 'full 
of potential danger' and that national ignorance and racism were 
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barriers to good relations with Japan. Support for racial equahty could 
have provided Australia with 'an excellent line of approach'. 
Melbourne was greeted with ridicule and sarcasm by British Under-
Secretary for Dominion Affairs, M. MacDonald, at a foreign policy 
conference in October 1934. MacDonald dismissed nationalistic 
foreign policy initiatives proposed by Melbourne as materialistic and 
self-interested and told delegates that Australia's interests were British 
interests: 
... I would say that he (Melbourne) a little bit underestimates the 
willingness of Great Britain to help Australia — if she may have the 
honour and privilege of doing so. (Laughter) ... What can Australia 
do to establish new markets for herself and secure the defence of her 
territory?" 
Latham, however, saw merit in some independent initiative. 
Although he had refused Hirota's offer to exchange diplomatic 
representatives, he did oversee Lloyd's confirmation as trade 
commissioner to Japan. There Lloyd remained suspicious of Japanese 
intentions and sent Canberra both trade and security information. 
His efforts were, however, often overlooked by an inexperienced 
government which, after appointing an intelligence officer to a 
sensitive trade post, failed to provide him with adequate 
accommodation or resources. In 1935 another head of military 
intelligence, Lt.Col. W.R. Hodgson, became secretary of the new 
Department of External Affairs. The appointments suggest 
government paranoia but disguised a public service problem — a 
shortage of qualified personnel. Until 1933 the service was the virtual 
monopoly of returned soldiers. In December legislation enabled 
university graduates to enter at third division level without examination 
but the act limited graduate intake to 10 per cent and by 1939 only 
56 were employed.^ 
In trade negotiations, Japan was pushing forward the issue of racial 
equahty, a move Lyons described as a bluff at the 1935 Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Conference in London. He did, however, plead for 
recognition of Japan's claim to Manchuria to keep Japanese attentions 
focussed on the north. After being rebuffed, Lyons audaciously 
suggested Britain should increase its defence capability as he 
untruthfully claimed Australia had done. Two months earlier 
Austraha's lack of preparedness had been criticised by British imperial 
defence secretary. Sir Maurice Hankey, following visits to Australia 
and New Zealand. His recommendation that the two countries co-
operate more closely only prompted Australia to redirect its arms sale 
and job saving ambitions from China to New Zealand — which 
rejected the overtures.* 
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More vitriolic criticism came from former protagonists Hughes and 
Piesse who, in 1935, went into print to warn of attack from Japan. 
Both pointed to increasing airpower. Bluntly, Hughes warned of the 
utter inadequacy of defences, Britain's inability to guarantee 
Australian security and to the fact that the Singapore base was 
incomplete. His outburst cost him his position in cabinet. Labor was 
even less enthusiastic about its former prime minister and passed a 
unanimous resolution calling for Australia to be kept free of 
'entanglements leading to a repetition of the horrors of 1918-18' and 
'non-participation.'^ 
Piesse had never lost his interest in foreign affairs and was an 
influential member of a select group which wrote and spoke about 
foreign policy. Others included former Versailles advisor Eggleston, 
chairman of the Commonwealth Grants Commission, and later 
Australian minister to China and Washington; Latham who would 
go to Japan; W Macmahon Ball who would head the Allied Council 
during the occupation of Japan; and, Clunies-Ross and C.A.S. 
Hawker who would have major roles in 1936 trade diversion 
negotiations. These appointments underscored a national problem — 
the small pool of informed opinion. In a nation with an infant 
External Affairs Department and few universities, foreign policy 
debate was generally restricted to Melbourne and Sydney circles. 
Austraha's only senior overseas diplomat was High Commissioner 
Bruce in London. Bruce supported the 'family' of empire and 
appeasement which found favour with Lyons and pre-war British 
leaders. As a former prime minister with excellent family and business 
contacts in Britain, he carried more authority and had more influence 
in both London and Canberra than a career diplomat. Further, as 
the London-based voice of Australian diplomacy, Bruce could not 
avoid facilitating the tradition of British domination of the Australian 
outlook. 
Another problem was the lack of critical reporting of Australian 
interests by the media at a time when parliamentary debate on foreign 
affairs was rare. In 1938 the media still received eighty-five percent 
of overseas news from Fleet Street sources reflecting British opinion 
— identified in a pre-war study as the single most inhibiting factor 
in the development of independent Australian public opinion.* The 
infant Australian Broadcasting Commission provided some public 
affairs talks but its news service was restricted by newspaper 
proprietors. Its major overseas sources were newspaper cables, the 
BBC and some part-time correspondents. The Sydney Morning Herald 
had innovatively sent senior defence journahst F.M. Cutlack in 1934 
to join Latham's eastern mission. After a lengthy stay in Japan and 
Manchuria as a guest of the Japanese, Cutlack urged his readers to 
recognise Manchurian 'independence'. In Herald and Melbourne Age 
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articles he reported there was neither an Enghshman nor an American 
in that 'no-man's land' who preferred Russian control. Manchuria 
was a natural outlet for Japan which could do Australia little if any 
real harm. Two years later Clunies-Ross observed that 'one great 
Sydney daily had addressed itself to the task of bringing about a re-
orientation in pubhc opinion' positive to Japan. A book produced 
from Cutlack's articles had Japanese government approval. Copies 
were widely distributed for propaganda purposes until the outbreak 
of the Pacific War. In 1939, as associate editor of the Herald, Cutlack 
was still being lavishly entertained by the Japanese consulate.' 
A 1936/36 survey of major eastern Australian newspapers found 
that most favoured the reassurance of a collective system through a 
strong League of Nations which was official British policy. It noted 
that the Bulletin had become less strident in its advocacy of an 
Austrahan outlook and freedom from imperial domination, a stance 
it was to embrace more fully as the decade progressed. It became more 
conservative under the leadership of H.K. Prior, another newspaper 
executive the target of Japanese attention in 1939.'° 
The survey ignored the Australian Women's Weekly, launched in 
1933 by Frank Packer. Ostensibly a women's magazine, the Weekly 
shattered national records in its second week with 160,000 sold in New 
South Wales alone. By 1940 sales were 450,(X)0 per week. Any pretence 
that men did not read it was abandoned during the war when millions 
of copies were sent to troops overseas. It was one of the nation's most 
influential publications. Although the magazine noted auspicious 
Japanese comings and goings in social columns, it failed to give serious 
coverage to the Sino-Japanese war. This, according to Packer, was 
merely a 'little local dust-up between the Japs and the Chinks' with 
not the slightest interest for Consolidated Press. In 1941 a Weekly 
correspondent sent to Singapore reassured readers that all was well 
with their men and boys in that fortress city." 
Smith's Weekly did not. It had been warning of the Japanese 
menace since 1919. Smith's reported in 1937 that Japan had revealed 
a 'ruthlessness and primitive barbarity' which, allied to its 'modern 
scientific techniques', formed a dangerous threat.'^ That year the 
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin appeared. The guiding hand was Eggleston's 
but this Bulletin offered a direct challenge to official policy and, 
despite its small circulation, may have had longer-term influence. The 
first edition flagged the headline ' Wanted — An Australian Foreign 
Policy'. It argued that Australia's immediate region was the 'Near 
North' not the 'Far East' and that it was the duty of Austrahan 
statesmen 'to study the Pacific to formulate a pohcy suited to 
Austraha's position'.'^ Despite the events of 1936 there was no 
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official reassessment until R.G. Menzies became prime minister in 
1939. 
In 1936 Australia's trade diversion policy had angered Japan and 
the United States and, in the longer term, failed to please Britain. 
The opening round in the trade war was fired by trade minister Sir 
Henry Gullett when he informed parliament of tariff increases on 
Japanese imports on the day it adjourned for the winter recess. He 
claimed they would boost Australian primary exports, expand 
secondary industry and increase employment. In reality, Austraha had 
bowed to pressure from Britain and British textile mills worried about 
competition from cheaper Japanese products. Japan retaliated with 
boycotts which stunned the Australian wool industry and boosted 
Japanese nylon research. Lyons attempted to address pubhc confusion 
in two national broadcasts in which he stretched the truth by blaming 
Japan for starting the dispute and playing on old fears. He stressed 
repeatedly that cheap Japanese products threatened Australian wages 
and living standards.'* 
On 1 January 1937 the two nations called an official halt to their 
trade war — largely as a result of initiative by individuals with little 
faith in government negotiations. Sissons' study of events reveals the 
leading unofficial negotiators were Hirodo, Sydney manager of 
Kanematsu trading company; Clunies-Ross of CSIRO; federal 
parliamentarian C.A.S. Hawker; and, Japanese Consul-General K. 
Murai. Both Clunies-Ross and Hawker, who had recently been in 
Japan, believed Japan was a more important trading partner than 
most Australians, and particularly Gullett, appeared to appreciate. 
This view was shared by Kanematsu which had opened its first 
Australian branch in 1890. Hirodo had been in Australia since 1910. 
He opened discussions in late September 1936 during after dinner 
drinks with his guest, Clunies-Ross, who relayed the tenor of the 
approach to Hawker. Hawker then consulted farmers, Attorney-
General Menzies and Lyons. In October Murai became involved, 
giving Japan the advantage of access to official negotiations with 
Gullett and unofficial negotiations which circumvented him. 
Eventually, private Japanese initiative became Australian government 
policy. Formal bi-lateral negotiations for a comprehensive trade 
agreement began in March 1937. Owing to 'questions' which 
continually arose, they were not completed, finally falling victim to 
fatigue and war." The events of 1936 had exposed serious divisions 
and ineptitude within government to the full view of the Japanese, 
undermined Lloyd's position in Japan, and disrupted a profitable 
export trade from which pre-war Australia never recovered. 
Lloyd remained vigilant. In April 1937 he secretly warned of 
Japanese interest in northern waters, New Guinea and Yampi Sound. 
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Lyons heeded the warning and at the Imperial Conference in London 
in May, he sought support for a Pacific non-aggression pact and 
reassurance from Britain that it could defend the empire. The first 
issue was side-stepped but Lyons was sufficiently reassured on the 
second to tell parliament that Singapore was a very powerful fortress 
whose capacity 'should be undoubted'. Defence figured prominently 
in 1937 federal election rhetoric but not as a serious financial 
commitment. In the 1937/38 budget. Defence spending reached only 
1.06 per cent of Gross National Product (GNP). 
As 1937 slipped into 1938, Australians celebrated their 150th 
anniversary and in February Australians swept all before them in the 
Empire Games medal tally. Both events reinforced Australia's close 
relationship with Britain and British pre-occupation with a militant 
Germany rather than a militant Japan. In November 75-year old 
Hughes became Minister for External Affairs. He had not lost any 
of his fight and was soon causing the government embarrassment over 
his disputes with the Italian and German consuls-general and public 
condemnations of Italy, Germany and Japan. There is some evidence 
that Hughes used his old union contacts during the pig-iron dispute 
of 1938.'* 
After some indecision, Lyons banned iron ore exports to Japan in 
May 1938, more than a year after Lloyd's warning. The Japanese had 
invested years of expensive developmental work in a Yampi Sound 
ore site, working through a British dummy company. Government 
approval for the project had followed Latham's 1934 visit to Japan. 
The ban enraged the company and prompted strong protests from 
the Japanese consul-general. Initially Lyons sought to justify the ban 
by sending the consul-general the full text of a commonwealth 
geological report which claimed Austrahan iron ore reserves were more 
limited than originally thought. He then had a change of heart and 
ordered a search for his communication which was intercepted next 
day in the Sydney mail rooms. Lyons subsequently used only sections 
of the report to the ban on iron ore exports. Scrap and pig-iron were 
excluded.'^ 
Maritime unions extended the ban to protest Japan's invasion of 
China and in November Port Kembla waterside workers refused to 
load pig-iron bound for Japan. It caused widespread suffering in the 
Illawarra region over Christmas as waterside and other workers lost 
jobs when government and industry closed ranks to force an end to 
the dispute. The dispute divided national public opinion. While it was 
a victory of sorts for Hughes, as it enUvened debate about Japan, 
he did little to aid the maturation of his own youthful department 
or provide government with considered foreign policy advice as 
international tensions mounted. Hughes preferred prophetic speeches 
'appealing directly to the people' to the daily tedium of departmental 
214 
administration.'* By failing to strengthen External Affairs, he 
encouraged even greater reliance on Bruce and Whitehall. Australia 
placed its trust in the strength of empire. The 1938/39 defence 
allocation rose to just 1.85 per cent of GNP. 
Lyons' sudden death in April 1939 shocked the nation. The new 
Prime Minister Menzies told Australians that while 'British countries 
of the world must stand or fall together', there were 'primary 
responsibilities and primary risks' in the Pacific, the first open 
acknowledgement of the risks by a prime minister. Defence spending 
for 1939/40 more than doubled to 4.5 per cent of GNP and Menzies 
announced plans to post diplomatic representatives to the United 
States, Japan and China. Action was delayed by a shortage of suitable 
appointees and intervention from London which trawled the red 
herring of imperial disunity across Menzies' path. R.G. Casey did not 
present his credentials in Washington until March 1940. Latham did 
not present his in Tokyo until December 1940 and Eggleston his in 
China until October 1941. In the interim, Bruce remained Canberra's 
most important overseas advisor. 
In September 1939 Menzies announced that because Britain was 
at war, so too was Australia. Whilst telling Australians to 'behave 
normally', Menzies was seeking reassurance from Britain. He was told 
the British admiralty accepted full responsibility for defending 
Australia and Singapore and had forces at its disposal for these 
'essential purposes'. Australia was apparently free to send a division 
to the aid of the mother country and Menzies was free to depart for 
London in early 1940. After a four month absence, he returned 
praising the heroism of the British people, having told the United 
States to step up arms production. He also had Churchill's personal 
assurance that Britain would 'proceed in good time' to Australia's 
aid 'with a fleet able to give battle to any Japanese force' placed in 
Austrahan waters." 
That was not what Britain told Canberra in a 'most secret' 
communication on 28 June 1940. Austraha was advised to defend 
herself and to send a division and two squadrons of aircraft to Malaya 
as a matter of urgency. The British chiefs of staff realised that 
Australia — which had neglected foreign affairs and defence while 
its ill-informed citizens were still enjoying a 'phoney' war — could 
not equip its troops in Malaya: 
... to full Western standards nor would this be necessary in view of 
the unUkelihood of the Japanese being able to bring mechanised troops 
with the latest form of equipment to attack them.^ ° 
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Thus was sealed the fate of Bill Bathgate and Russell Braddon. They 
feh victim, not to fear of the Japanese but to neglect of foreign affairs 
by Australia's pre-war political masters. 
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